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SHELBY L. BREWER 
Pro se-Pro tern 
5051 South, 1130 West 
Taylorsville,Utah 84123 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Shelby L. Brewer, 
Claimant-Appellant 
Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Department of Employment 
Security, 
Respondent 
PETITION FOR 
REHEARING ' 
I 
CASE # 880097-CA j 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE 
JUDGES THEREOF : 
I,Shelby L. Brewer, hereinafter referred to in second and third 
person as Claimant-Appellant do hereby petition for rehearing. 
BACKGROUND 
Claimant-Appellant at issue with the Department of Employment 
Security, hereinafter referred to as "The Department", sat before 
Administrative Law Judge Norman Barnes on 10-20-87 and was 
handed a negative finding on 11-13-87 which was subsequently 
affirmed by the Board of Review. The Claimant-Appellant 
subsequently prepared a brief for the Utah Court of Appeals 
and presented it within the time required. The brief was rejected 
by the office staff at the Court of Appeals on the basis that 
the Pica type appeared too small and that the brief did not 
contain an addendum. The Claimant-Appellant was then given 
(in keeping with rule 27-a-4) five days to make the noted 
corrections! although 27-a-4 does not specify a time period). 
At considerable cost to the Appellant the brief was changed and 
expensive vello bindings were purchased for the second time. 
But before the Claimant-Appellants 5 days were up he recieved 
in the mail a notice that the Court of Appeals had made a 
decision, a negative finding, affirming the position of the 
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Board of Review without allowing the Claimant-Appellant the 
benefit of presenting any arguments or facts in his defense. 
After great cost and effort in the preparation of a brief the 
Claimant-Appellant was informed that no one would even look at it, 
that in fact he was to be presumed guilty without the opportunity 
to present a single argument. The purpose of this instrument 
is to show why the Claimant-Appellant must be heard. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CLAIMANT DID IN FACT MAKE A TIMELY APPEAL 
The Board of Review only affirmed that the claimant's appeal 
was not timely by a definition which only honored it's own 
waiver forms and methods. In fact the Claimant-Appellant knows 
that of course he did not sign the waiver on time, as required 
by the waiver. The avoidance of signing itfat all,was a purposeful 
and intentional act, ex necessitate legis, as per the higher 
authority of Constitutional dictum. However, the Claimant-
Appellant did,in fact, register several early-on protests and 
appeals to the Department which were completely ignored, this 
in the form of unanswered letters. , 
ARGUMENT 
THE CLAIMANT IS NOT GUILTY OF INACTION 
On 7-30-84 was the last day the Claimant worked. 
On 8-16-84 the Claimant applied for unemployment insurance. 
On 2-28-85 the claimant applied to JTPA. On 5-13-85 the claimant 
requested TRA. On 4-22-86 the claimant recieved a decision of 
eligibility and approval for training. On 5-6-86 the claimant 
recieved a one week redetermination which billed him for $186.00 
for time missed in school.Yet the Claimant does not identify 
conclusion of training as an improper break in training, and 
subsequent to his exemplary completion of training the Claimant 
filled out job search cards for work that he sought out, as per 
the requirement of the department. Summarily, the Claimant 
had dutifully met the Department's requirements and was now 
being billed for $186.00. On 6-6-86 the Claimant recieved the 
letter with the "re-interpretation of the 26 week period", 
On 7-31-86 Department of Employment Security mailed a letter 
wherein they had decided to change their policy decisions toward Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the 26 week period and to enforce it's new position 
retroactively charging the not-at-fault Claimant for their 
mistake and billing the Claimant for their $1,302.00 debt to 
the Department of Labor. After recieving this very turbid 
letter the claimant registered an adamant Constitutional 
protest among his family, his friends and with his Bishop. 
Through such public protest it turned out that one of the 
Claimant's more distant friends shared with him details wherein 
the friends mother had won a similar case proving that the 
money was owed to the Federal government and not to the State 
of Utah. More compelling than this,however, was the Claimant's 
own son's insistence that the Department's actions where an 
infringement of the Ex Post Facto provisions in the United 
States Constitution. The Claimant was moved by his son Troy 
Brewer's reminder that in 6 months it would be the 200th 
anniversary of the United States Constitution. Page 84 & 85 of the 
official record are actual photocopies from the school book 
of the Claimant's son Troy. Everyone in the Claimant's family 
felt that a Constitutional defense was a duty of conscience. 
Greatly disturbed that he had done nothing whatsoever wrong the 
Claimant handwrote a letter appealing to thfc Department of 
Employment Security, asking them to please confront him with 
what he had done wrong. This was to be the first of a series of 
handwritten letters which were all unanswered. On page 73 and 
74 of the official record is found a handwritten letter available 
for record only because the claimant now realized the vital need 
to photocopy his letters all of which had been heretofore 
ignored. On page 76 of the official record is another photocopied 
letter written by the claimant, this one serves as evidence that 
the department ignored the Appellants letters, wherein on the 
bottom of the letter is a Post Script which desperately and 
pleadingly reads ; PLEASE RESPOND TO THIS LETTER 
CATAGORICAL CONCLUSION : The Claimant made a seasonal protest 
of the Unconstitutional process but the Department of Unemployrent 
Security like a great unaccountable machine ignored the 
Claimant's letters and thus is guilty of inaction. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS VOH) 
In the entirety of the hearing with Norman Barnes "timeliness" 
was never mentioned, rather the majority of all discussions 
pertained to determining that the Claimant was completely 
innocent of fault and with Constitutional defense. After an 
impassioned presentation of issues of importance to the Constitution 
and to the public interest Norman Barnes ignored his great 
responsibility to accept argument which is; "Compelling and 
Reasonable...and for Good Cause", as is required by the Utah 
Department of Employment Security Unemployment Insurance Rules 
for section 35-4-6 (c); 
H. A late appeal may be considered on it's merits if it 
is determined that the appeal was delayed for gobd_£au£e. 
Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is shown that: 
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances 
which are £2H[P£iiAH£_i*!2£*._£££££HB^i£• 
It is proper that courts induldge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver of fundamental Constitutional rights, see; 
BROOKHART V JANIS, 384 US 1, 16 L Ed 2d 314, 86 S Ct 1245, 
7 Ohio Misc 77, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 141; 
JOHNSON V ZERBST, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019 
146 ALR 357(in which it was said that courts do not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights) 
TAYLOR V UNITED STATES, 99 App DC 183,238 F2d 259 
SMITH V UNITED STATES, 337 US 137, 93 L Ed 1264, 69 S CT 
1000 (Waiver is not lightly to be inferred). 
Very strong proof is necessary to convince the court that a 
Constitutional right has been waived; 
MIRANDA V ARIZONA, 384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 
1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974. 
Secondly, in point, the Board of Review wrote that they "adopted 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the administrative 
law judge", yet the administrative law judge "concluded that he 
had"no_2H£i£^i£ii£H"» i n t h i s instance. Given that the administrativ 
law judge admittedly has no jurisdiction over the matter and the 
Board of Review endorses the Administrative Law Judge's position, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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it follows that both the Administrative Law Judge and the Board 
of Review have no jurisdiction, are CORAM NON JUDICE, and 
conclusively the judgement is void. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE ARE TWO TIMELINESS REQUIREMENTS AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE 
TO SUIT BOTH 
The Claimant is required both to show an early assertion of 
his Constitutional rights and also to abstain from the 
process which he is protesting. Yet a timely assertion of 
rights in the Constitutional sense apparently does not save 
one from the timeliness infraction brought on by not signing 
the Department's waiver. Instead the early Constitutional protest 
of the Department of Employment Security waiver results in 
a Departmental "non-timely" status. This is a veritable 
"Catch 22" darned if you do - darned if yoii donjt paradox which 
serves to remind us, "Impotentia Excusat Legem", impossibility 
is an excuse in the law. 
POINT ONE IN FACT: ... PARTIES ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ILLEGAL STATUTE BY PARTICIPATING 
AND AQUIESING IN IT.,see BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS 
V JOHNSON, 178 Ky 287, 199 SW 8, One may not avail himself 
of a purely statutory right and at the same time challenge, on 
the ground of unconstitutionality, the restrictions of the same 
statute. ATKINS V HERTZ DRIVURSELF STATIONS, INC., 237 NY 352, 185 
NE 408, affd 291 US 641, 78 L Ed 1039, 54 S Ct 437. 
Failure to obstain from the illegal process which the Claimant 
deemed illegal would not only have constituted a personal, civic 
and Federal crime against the public interest but on the 
technical level could have estopped the Claimant from a later 
assertion of right. This non-accomplice posture has nonetheless 
resulted in an attempt by the Department to estop the Claimant 
from declaring his rights and to further waive the Claimant's 
Constitutional rights as punishment for his dissention from 
this very same illegal process. By this means the Department 
makes people guilty by what they do or guilty by what they 
don't do in a missapplication where the Claimant loses both 
ways and the Department wins both ways, yet the true nature of 
waivers and estoppels are to insure that you can't have it 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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both ways.CLARK V SMITH 193 Tenn 194, 245 SW2d 197 
One can not in the same proceedings both assail a statute and 
rely upon it. An interjection at this point with regard to 
estoppel^against having it both ways ; The principles of 
estoppel developed in constitutional questions apply not only 
to individuals and corporations, but also to the state, see 
SWEENEY V STATE , 251 NY 417, 167 NE 519; 
STATE EX REL. CLEMMER & JOHNSON CO. V TURNER,93 Ohio St 379, 
113 NE 327, as well as municipal corporations, Re Syracuse 
224 NY 201, 120 NE 203; PEOPLE EX REL. REYNOLDS V COMMON 
COUNCIL OF BUFFALO, 140 NY 300, 35 NE 485. 
POINT TWO IN FACT:... SEPARATE FROM DEPARTMENTAL TIMELINESS 
IS THE CLAIMANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR TIMELINESS 
IN ASSERTION OF RIGHT. 
Although obliged to abstain from the process which the Claimant 
deemed illegal he did register early on letters and calls of 
protest asserting his concern for Constitutional right, which 
has been the basis of all his assertion. 
YAKUS V UNITED STATES 321 US 414m 88 L Ed 834, 64 S Ct 660, 28 Ohio 
Ops 220; 
STATE V LANCASTER, 25 Ohio st 2d 83, 54 Ohio Ops 2d 222, 267 
NE 2d 291. 
A party who claims that he has been deprived of a constitutional 
right may have waived his privilege of asserting it's existence 
by his laches in raising the constitutional quesiton. 
WATKINSON V VAUGHN, 182 Cal 55, 186 P 753. I Fla L Rev 460. 
In fact,however, the claimant raised the constitutional issue 
from day one and has documentation of such. Thus it can be said 
that the Claimant meets timeliness requirements for the 
Constitutional protest yet he did not satisfy the department's 
forms as a necessary abstainance, not through laches or inaction. 
The Department of Employment Security in fact ignored all the 
Claimant's letters until they forced him through Bills of Attainder 
threatening great punishment to use the actual word '"Appeal", 
although the Claimant believed that this word offended the 
Due Process protections as it was used in his not at fault situation 
The Claimant abhorred the wording of the waiver, which read, 
^y-Z£A-2X££E£yni£Ili£ when in fact the overpayments are not the 
not-at-fault Claimants'. 
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The Claimant indignantly opposed having this illegal and 
improper debt thrust upon him from day one. The Claimant 
requested in a timely fashion to be confronted with anything 
he had done wrong.The Claimant made timely assertion of his 
rights invalidating non-timeliness charges. 
Norman Barnesfnegative finding on page 125 of the official 
record state, "The claimant did not agree with the wording in 
documents mailed to him by the Department" and "It has been 
the Claimant's impression that the actions of the Department has 
infringed on his constitutional rights", Barnes ignored this 
"Good Cause" and this "Compelling and Reasonable" fact called 
the United States Constitution , although he knew this to be 
the Claimant's most compelling and reasonable good cause from 
the outset. 
IT IS AN ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT NO ONE MAY WAIVE THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST INVOLVED IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
CATAGORICAL CONCLUSION: 
THE NON-TIMELY FINDING IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DETRIMENTAL TO PUBLIC INTEREST. 
IF TO THE CHAGRIN OF THE DEPARTMENT,WE ARE SORRY, BUT WE PROUDLY 
STATE BELOW CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH CAN NOT BE WAIVED 
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST UNLESS WE CHOOSE TO NEXT EMBRACE COMMUNISM. 
DUE PROCESS 
Claimant-Appellant, Sui Juris, of his own right, having 
legal capacity to act for himself determined that, ipso facto, 
by the fact itself, innocence andta "not-at-fault" status 
protect and dissassociate one from liability or punishment. 
The Onus Probandi, or Burden of Proof lies with the accuser.In 
this case there has been no crime, only automatic guilt and a 
surplus of threats of punishment. It has been a noted manuever 
to "railroad" an innocent man by attacking him without charging 
him with a crime thus dissallowing him a jury trial. All the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Claimant has requested from the beginning is to be confronted 
with his wrongdoing. The 5th amendment protection allowing one 
to stand by his innocence is only possible through the due 
process requisite that the Department be disallowed from 
imposing liability without fault and presuming damages without 
proof of injury. The process which affronted the claimant was 
absent of Onus Probandi. No preponderance of evidence has been 
presented, rather there is no evidence of wrongdoing at all. 
Instead the Burden of Proof requires a preponderance of evidence. 
CALIF. EVID. CODE 115 
All the elements of a crime must be prooven by the government 
beyond a reasonable doubt, In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25L. Ed. 2d 368 
In the claimant's case, however, there is no crime, only 
punishment and plenty of it; see line 18-32 on pp 83 of the 
official record. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPARTMENT'S TRANSFERRAL OF IT'S DEBT TO THE CLAIMANT 
AND IT'S SUBSEQUENT PUNITIVE ACTIONS TO ENFORCE SAME IS 
UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS! 
Due Process is not merely a procedural safeguard; it 
reaches those situations where the deprivation o f life, liberty, 
or property is accomplished by legislation which, by operating 
in the future, can, given even the fairest procedure in application 
to individuals, destroy the enjoyment of all three; 
POE V ULLMAN, 367 US 497, 6 1 Ed 2d 989, 81 S Ct 1752 
reh den 368 US 869, 7 L Ed 2d 69, 82 S Ct 21 and reh den 368 US 869 
7L Ed 2d 69, 82 S Ct 22 (Opinion of Harlan, J.) 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS MAYBE ROUGHLY DEFINED AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTY THAT NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF HIS LIFE, LIBERTY, 
OR PROPERTY FOR ARBITRARY REASONS. To the extent that arbitrary 
action involves procedural arbitrariness, such action is, of 
course, barred by the prnciple of procedural due process. It has 
been said that protection from arbitrary action is the essence of 
substantive due process; 
SLOCHOWER V BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 350 US 55;,100 L 
Ed 692, 76 S Ct 637, reh den 351 US 944, 100 L Ed 1470 
76 S Ct 843 
JACK LINCOLN SHOPS, INC. V STATE DRY CLEANERS BOARD, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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192 OKLA 251, 135 P2d 332. THE TOUCHSTONE OF DUE PROCESS IS 
PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AGAINST ARBITRARY ACTION OF GOVERN-
MENT; 
WOLFF V MCDONNELL, 418 US 539 41 L Ed 2d 935, 94 S Ct 
2963, 71 Ohio Ops 2d 336, and similarly in substantive 
law, due process may be characterized as a standard of reasonable-
ness, Re Lutker (Okla Crim) 274 P2d 786, which is similar 
to the standard or test of "rational grounds" used in determining a 
claim of unequal protection of the laws. 
DUE PROCESS IS A LIMITATION UPON ARBITRARY POWER AND A GUARANTY 
AGAINST ARBITRARY LEGISLATION DEMANDING THAT THE LAW NOT BE 
UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, OR CAPRICIOUS., 
NEBBIA V NEW YORK,291 US 502m 78 L Ed 940, 54 S Ct 505,89 ALR1469 
HEINER V DONNAN, 285 US 312, 76L Ed 772, 52 S Ct 358 
POLAR ICE CREAM AND CREAMERY CO. V ANDREWS (ND Fla) 208 F 
Supp 899, revd on other groundds 375 US 361, 11L Ed 2d 389 
84 S Ct 378; 
DAVIS V FLORIDA POWER CO., 64 Fla 246, 60 So 759; 
SEABOARD A. L. RY. V SIMON, 56 Fla 545, 47 So 1001; 
MT. CARMEL PUBLIC UTILITY & SERIVCE CO. V PUBLIC UTILITIES COM., 
297111 303, 130 NE 693, 21 ALR 571; 
WALGREEN CO. V GROSS INCOME TAX DIV., 225 Ind 418, 75 NE2d 
784, 1 ALR2d 1014; 
ULMAN V MAYOR, etc., of BALTIMORE, 72 Md 587. 20 A 141, 
affd 165 US 719, 41 L Ed 1184, 17 S Ct 1001; 
THURMAN V CHICAGO, M.& S..P.R. Co., 254 Mass 569, 151 NE 63 
46 ALR 56 3; 
ALBRITTON V WINONA, 181 Miss 75, 178 So 799, 115 ALR 1436, 
app dismd 303 US 627, 82 L Ed 1088, 58 S Ct 766; 
BRYANT V BROWN, 151 Miss 398, 118 So 184, 60 ALR 1325; 
HANSON y UNION P.R. CO., 160 Neb 669, 71 NW2d 526, revd on 
other grounds 351 US 979, 100 L Ed 1494, 76 S Ct 1044 and 
reh den 352 US 859, I L Ed 2d 69, 77 S Ct 1044 and reh den 
352 US 859, I L Ed 2d 69, 77 S Ct 22; 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK V BOVEY, SHUTE AND JACKSON, INC., 49 ND 
450, 191 NW 765; 
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RE LUTKER (OKLA CRIM) 274 P2d 786; 
SANDEL V STATE, 115 SC 168, 104 SE 567, 13 ALR 1268 (ovrld on 
other grounds'SIRRINE V STATE 132 SC 241, 128 SE 172) 
KELLEHER V MTNSHUL1, 11 Wash 2d 380, 119 P2d 302. 
The courts, as custodians of the judicial powers of government, 
are not obliged to enforce a statute which, through a rule of 
evidence, such as we have in this case, arbitrarily deprives 
a litigant of his rights, or which permits a defendant to suffer 
conviction without due process of law.; 
PEOPLE V JOHNSON, 68 Cal 2d 646, 68 Cal Rptr 599, 441 P2d 111 
cert den 393 US 1051, 21 L Ed 2d 693, 89 S Ct 679. 
ARGUMENT: 
THE DEPARTMENT'S ACTIONS IMPAIRS THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. 
A statute cannot Constitutionally impose an obligation with 
respect to a transaction which, at the time it took place gave rise 
to no obligation. 
MULLIGAN v HILTON, 305 Mass 5, 24 NE 2d 676, 1333 ALR 376 
ARGUMENT: 
THE DEPARTMENT MISSAPPLIED POLICY RETROSPECTIVELY 
Although retrospectively is analagous to "Ex Post Facto", the 
term has been used broadly to include any statute which operates 
retrospectively. Constitutional provision prohibiting retrospective 
laws covers laws which create a right where none before existed 
and which relate back so as to confer on a party the benefit of 
such right and as is applied to this case covers also all such 
laws as take away or impair any vested right acquired under 
existing laws, create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or 
attach a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations 
already past; 
STURGES y CARTER, 114 US 511, 29 L Ed 240, 5 S Ct 1014; 
NEW ORLEANS V CLARK, 95 US 644, 24 L Ed 531; 
BRITISH AMERICA ASSUR. CO. V COLORADO & S.R. CO., 52 Colo 589 
125 P 508; 
FRENCH VDEANE, 19 Colo 504, 36 P 609; 
BULLARD V HOLMAN, 184 Ga 788, 193 SE 586, 113 ALR 763; 
ROSS H LETTICE, 134 Ga 866, 68 SE 734; 
SMITH V DIRCKX, 283 Mo 188, 223 SW 104, 11 ALR 510; 
STATE V KYLE, 166 Mo 287, 65 SW 763; 
HOPE MUT. INS. CO. B FLYNN, 38 Mo 483; 
DOW V NORRIS, 4 NH 16; 
STATE EX REL. MICHAELS H MORSE (App) 75 Ohio L Abs 536, affd 
165 Ohio St 599, 60 Ohio Ops 531, 138 NE2d 592; 
COUNTY C0MfRS OF HAMILTON M ROSCH, 50 Ohio St 103, 33 NE 408; 
CRUMP V GUYER, 60 Okla 222, 157 P 321, 2ALR 331; 
- LEWIS V PENNSYLVANIA R-V CO.,,. 220 Pa 317, 69A 821; 
SHIELDS V CLIFTON HILL LAND CO., 94 Tenn 123, 28 Sw 668; 
WYNNE'S LESSEE V WYNNE, 32 Tenn 405. 
The Constitutional inhibition against retroactive legislation is 
against such legislation as injuriously affects individuals and 
their vested rights. NEW ORLEANS - CLARK, 95 US 644, 24 L Ed 521. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law ibrary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DEPARTMENT'S RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION EFFECTS IMPAIRMENT 
OF VESTED RIGHTS 
The Claimant is to this day recieving bills totalling nearly 
$1,500,00 which are the state's debt to the Department of Labor 
and are not owed by the not-at-fault Claimant. In an effort to 
force the Claimant to pay this debt which he did not incurr, 
the State Department of Employment Security has threatened to 
sell the Claimant's home and all of his possessions at a 
Sheriff's sale removing his right to life, liberty, the pursuit 
of happiness, the security of his home, his marriage, his possessions, 
and everything he has worked hard to earn by the sweat of his 
brow. Under the restraint which the 14th Amendment to the 
Federal Constituiton imposes upon retrospective legislation, 
as well as under the restraints imposed thereon by the Utah 
State Constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting the enactment 
of retrospective laws, there can be no divesting of vested rights 
by legislative fiat without violating the Constitution; 
UNITED BAKING CO. V BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY WORKERS' UNION 
257 App Div 501, 1085, 14NY52d 74. 
If a retrospective act which is neither an ex post facto law nor 
one impairing the obligation of a contract should nevertheless 
operate so as to take away a right or a property, it may still 
be unconstitutional and void, not because it is retrospective, 
but by reason of i t'-s repugnancy to the 14th Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution guarenteeing due process of law; 
TRUAX V C0RRIGAN, 257 US 312, 66 L Ed 254, 42 S Ct 124, 
27 ALR 375; 
ETT0R V TAC0MA, 228 US 148, 57 L Ed 773, 33 S Ct 428; 
ALDRIDGE V TUSCUMBIA, C. & D.R.R. CO. (Ala) 2 Stew & P 199; 
FALL RIVER VALLEY IRRIG. DIST.V MT. SHASTA POWER CORP., 
202 Cal 56, 259 P 444, 56 ALR 264; 
PREVESLIN V DERBY & ANS0NIA DEVELOPING CO., 112 Conn 129 
5il A 518, 70 ALR 1426; 
STANFORD £ McCLELLAND, 121 Fla 253, 163 So 513; 
PEOPLE EX REL EITEL M LINDHEIMER, 371 111 367, 21 NE2d 318 
124 ALR 1472, app dismd 308 US 505, 84 L Ed 432, 60 S Ct 111; 
STATE EX REL BOYNTON v PUBLIC SERVICE COM., 135 Kan 491, 11 
P2d 999; 
BOOTH V HAIRSTON, 193 NC 278, 136 SE 879, 57 ALR 1196; 
LOWE V HARRIS, 112 NC 472, 17 SE 539; 
GREENOUGH V GREENOUGH, 11 Pa 489 
ARGUMENT: 
THE WAIVER OF THE CLAIMANT'S RIGHTS IS NON-CONSENSUAL AND ILLEGAL 
Black's law dictionary defines a waiver as "The intentional or 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right". Intentional or voluntary 
are key terms in the definition of waiver and abandonment or 
or forfieture of rights. The claimant did not wish to waive his 
not at fault status or his constitutional rights protecting 
his existing innocence. 
CONJUNCTIVE ARGUMENT: 
THE CLAIMANT DID NOT WISH TO BE GUILTY OF COMPLICITY AS AN ACCOMPLICE 
TO SUPPORT, AID, ABET OR TO ENJOIN AN ILLEGAL PROCESS AND THEREBY 
BE LATER ESTOPPED IN HIS PROTEST OF SAME OR HIS ASSERTION OF RIGHTS 
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Black's law dictionary defines estoppel as follows; 
Estoppel means that party is prevented by his own act from claiming 
a right to detriment of other party who was entitled to rely on 
such conduct and has acted accordingly, 
GRAHAM V ASBURY 112 Ariz. 184, 540 P 2d 656, 658. An estoppel 
arises when one is forbidden by law to speak against his own act 
or deed. 
GURAL V ENGLE, 128 NJL 252, 2d 257, 261. 
While in the outset the Claimant did not understand the turbid 
letters which in the face of his innocence appeared to punish 
him for carefully, properly and correctly following the rules, 
(the claimant espescially was confused with the fact ithat the 
letters said "you are not at fault", and "that no attempt would 
be made to collect until new Federal TRA program regulations 
were put into effect, clearly summoning the Claimant to "Go On Hold" 
As it turned out a U.S. District Court Order was dissallowing the 
collection of non-fault overpayments until valid guidelines were 
adopted, and it is no doubt in that same spirit that the Claimant 
refuses to undersign any waiver, document or paper which reads, 
"My TRA Overpayments" or My Theft or My Murder or any other 
capricious and untrue statement when the overpayments are in no 
way or sense his) the Claimant did not wish to sigh any statement 
which would later estop him from asserting the facts and his vested 
rights. The appellant did not and does not wish to do anything 
which could result in the waiving, the compromise or the forfieture 
of his Federal Constitutional rights. In this connection it has been 
noted that a originally established by the United States Supreme 
Court, waiver of Constitutional rights was a consensual concept, 
depending on INTENTIONAL RELINQUISHMENT OR ABANDONMENT OF A KNOWN 
RIGHT" , 
JIMJNEZ V ESTELLE ( CA 5- TEX) 557 -F2d 506, referring to 
JOHNSON V ZERBST, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 Ct 1019, 
146 ALR 357. 
FOR- A WAIVER TO BE EFFECTIVE IT MUST BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT 
THERE WAS AN INTENTIONAL MtIM2LII§llMI?il-2£-M^!i£2Il?lM1^2I^^ 
KNOWN_R:EGHT_OR_PIUV:ELEGE , 
BROBKHART V JANIS, 384 US 1, 16L Ed 2d 314, 86 S Ct 1245, 
7 Ohio Misc 77 36 Ohio Ops 2d 141. 
CATAGORICAL C0NCLUIS0N: 
The waiver system imposed upon the appellant has not met the 
£ons>enjb requirement but rather has ignored overt £!£,s£rit; 
and even more the Department is re-writing the definition of the 
legal truth into a false picture so as to make dissent an infractior 
rather than the legal antithesis of consent which it is. This is 
capricious and unreasonable and a phenomena which we can not allow 
to stand or to take root, directly or indirectly. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPARTMENT'S ACTIONS VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO LAWS 
Among the types of retroactively applied changes in the law 
which the courts have recognized as being violative of the 
Ex Post Facto clauses are changes which impose or initiate 
punishment for an act innocent when committed. This could not 
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better describe the Department's mistake and the transfer of 
that mistake to a not-at-fault claimant, see; 
FLETCHER 7 PECK, 10 US 87, 3 L Ed 162; 
DOBBERT '.' FLORIDA, 432US, 53 L Ed 2d 344, 97 S Ct 2290, 
reh den 434 US 882, 54 L Ed 2d-344, 97 SCt 246; 
BOUIE V COLUMBIA 378 US 347, 12 L Ed 2d 894, 84 S Ct 1697; 
BEACELL V OHIO, 269 US 167, 70 L Ed 216, 46 S Ct 68; 
MALLEY V SOUTH CAROLINA, 237 US 180, 59 L Ed 905, 35 S 
MALLETT 7 NORTH CAROLINA, 181 US 589, 45 L Ed 1015, 21 
DUNCAN V MISSOURI, 152 US 377, L Ed 485,14 S Ct 570; 
KRING V MISSOURI,107 US 221, 27 L Ed 506, 2 S Ct 443; 
BURGESS V SALMON, 97" US 381, 24L Ed 1104 
GUT STATE, 76 US 35, 19 L Ed 573; 
CUMMINGS V MISSOURI, 71 US 277, 18L Ed 356; 
CALDER V BULL, 3 US 386, L Ed 648. 
Ct 507 
South Ct730 
ARGUMENT 
THE CLAIMANT AND FAMILY ARE BEING VICTIMIZED BY BILLS OF ATTAINDER 
The presence of punishment is also important in identifying the 
Department's subsequent actions as to encroach Constitutional 
Prohibition of Bills of Attainder, United States Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Warren once commented that the best 
available evidence- the writings of the architects ' 
of our Constitutional System- indicates that the Bill of Attainder 
clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore 
soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation 
of the separation of powers, a general safegaurd against legislative 
excercise of the judicial function, or put more simply , 
B_£S££SBH£^--S£5:i2;£i-_i£iSi--.^Z--i£Si£iS^H££^. See 326 et seq. supra., 
UNITED STATES V BROWN, 381 US 437, 14L Ed 2d 484, 85 S Ct 1707 
Thus, legislative acts, no_mat jer__wha t_ their^f orm , that apply in 
such a way as to in£li£t_punishment_withou^ _ 
liiA£_££_A^jsajLnd£r^ 
If there is still any form or fashion of events whereby one 
thinks they can skirt this great dictum by going round robin 
but yet arriving at the same effect the standard is no,for; 
CUMMINGS V MISSOURI, 71 US 277, 18 L Ed 356 
reveals that the enactment of a bill of attainder in violation of 
the Constitution cannot be done by indirection. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE "NOT-AT-FAULT" CLAIMANT IS NOT LIABLE 
The Utah Employment Security Act, as-amended, as issued by the 
Department of Employment Security Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Section 35, 4, 6 (E), under non-fault overpayments 
states unequivocally that; "If any person has recieved any sum 
as benefits under this act to which under a redetermination 
or decision he was not entitled, and it has been found that he was 
without fault in the matter, he is not liable to repay such sum...". 
POINT 2 
The Federal Register is to be the guide for state laws which must 
be made within it's context. The Department of Labor, Employ-
ment and Training Administration, Trade Adjustment Assistance 
for workers; final rules, 20CFR Part 617.55 entitled, "Overpayments; 
Penalties for fraud", under section (a)l makes clear the two 
guidelines for the state agency to waive individual liability; 
(a) (1) (i) "The payment was made without fault on the part of 
such individual; and (II) Requiring such repayment would be contrary 
to equity and good conscience". It is important to reiterate 
that state law can only be derived within the margins and the 
context of the Federal Register quoted above. 
POINT 3 
In a call to Clarence Zack, the Assistant Director of the Office of 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Employment and Training Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor's Regional office in Denver, Mr. Zack 
admitted that "nowhere in the context of 20CFR does it intimate 
or suggest that the state lean on claimants to pay the state debt, 
but he said, "they've got to get the money somewhere". 
REITERATED EXPLANATION 
The Department of Employment Security made a mistake in interpreting 
a 26 week eligibility period(as indicated on page 58 of the 
official record, as spoken by Byron Davenport) where Chief of 
Benefits for the Utah Department of Employment Security admitted 
l!l£-E££^ £il!i£!li-.^ ££-!I.^ ££!l£" i n interpretting a 26 week period as 
26 weeks of payment rather than a 26-week "running clock" period. 
Then the Department of Employment Security was told by the 
Department of Labor that _thj?J.were liable for the monetary 
repayment incurred by the 26 week misinterpretation dated July 31,'8 
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CATAGORICAL CONCLUSION 
THE DEBT IS OWED THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BY THE UTAH 
EMPLYMENT SECURITY DUE TO THEIR OWN ERROR. 
As is indicated by Clarence Zack's remark, "They've got to get 
it somewhere" , the department is unreasonably, arbitrarily 
and capriciously passing the buck to hte "not-at-fault" claimant. 
The claimant is not only "not-at-fault", but is now a vi^ti^m 
of his earlier diligence and cooperation with the department's 
every directive. The claimant can not be officially 
"entitled" then and not "entitled" now on_a_r e t r o acjt i ve_b ass ij3. 
The "not-at-fault" claimant can not be punished with liability 
when the department is responsible. It would be more fair to 
attach the wages of the department's employees who are responisble 
for misinterpretting the 26 week period than to attack the claimant 
who is only responsible for dutifully obeying directions and 
did not get to participate in or to share in the "time-period 
misinterpretation mistake". 
THE NOT-AT-FAULT CLAIMANT IS NOT LIABLE. 
WE CONCLUDE; 
Jot for Jot, case for case, bag and baggage the Department'^ 
attack can not withstand Constitutional scrutiny. 
If you fail to support the absolution of the not at fault 
claimant,and this illegal action is allowed to stahd, you will 
be stabbing at the very heart of the United States Constitution. 
The Unconstitutional construction of a policy which allows improper 
debt transfer from the State to the Claimant is repugnant 
and does not reflect the standards of the people of Utah and 
the people of Utah should freely exercise their true 9th and 10th 
Amendment rights to pursuade their elected representatives to 
investigate how such an Orwellian script could become real life 
in 1988. The Claimant is not responsible by being not at fault. 
The responsible party must be held lialbe. The Claimant's innocence 
estops him from waiving his guilt. The Claimant is guilty of 
no disqualifying situations such as school absentses or failure 
in following agency rules. Court transcript reveals that although 
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the Claimant adressed these issues individually and extensivel 
these vital facts have been entirely ignored by the Department 
way of the weak technicality of timeliness. In fact, however, 
the Department has yet to answer one of the Claimants letters. 
Surely the spirit of the law should be given a modicum of 
consideration. Or consider if you will the behest of Corrinthi 
2:2,"The letter killeth, but the Spirit Giveth Life". 
The Court can dispose of this case either on narrow technical 
grounds which will result in it's being tried over again and 
appealed again, or on broad equitable principles. We hope it 
will choose the latter and thus effectively put an end to this 
controversy that has already gone on too long at the expense 
of the taxpayer. 
DATED THIS^J? DAY OF JUNE, 1988 
]AJU4&U-
SHELKY L/ BREWER 
CLAIMANT-APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
SERVED the foregoing Petition for Rehearing by 
mailing a copy, postage prepaid to the following this ^ ^ day 
of June, 1988: Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Department of Employment Security, 1234 South Main Stree 
P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
